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NO LONGER A PAPER TIGER: THE EEOC AND ITS
STATUTORY DUTY TO CONCILIATE1
ABSTRACT
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
effectuate the ends of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. To effectuate those ends, Congress vested the EEOC with
authority to not only receive, investigate, and conciliate charges of
employment discrimination, but also to enforce Title VII against private
employers who discriminate by initiating suit against them.
After the EEOC receives a charge of employment discrimination, it must,
after completing an investigation, attempt to conciliate the charge with a
private employer accused of discrimination before initiating suit. The EEOC’s
“duty to conciliate is at the heart of Title VII,” so a critical question arises
when the EEOC appears to violate its duty by, for instance, making egregious
demands of an employer: what is the proper standard for reviewing whether
the agency has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate? The federal circuit
courts of appeals are split between two standards of review—the deferential
and the stringent standards of review.
This Comment argues that the deferential standard of review is inadequate
to protect private employers from the EEOC’s potential abuse of its statutory
duty. Rather, the stringent standard is the proper standard, and it is consistent
with the text, purpose, legislative history, and jurisprudence of Title VII.

1 The phrase “paper tiger” appears in a speech Senator James Browning Allen of Alabama delivered
during the senatorial debates before the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, passed. See 118 CONG. REC. 3803 (1972) (statement of Sen. James Allen).
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INTRODUCTION
Robert Lewis filed a charge of discrimination against his employer, the
Asplundh Tree Expert Company, with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, alleging that he suffered racial discrimination when Pete Evans
crafted a noose from a piece of rope and placed it around Lewis’s neck.2 After
investigating the charge for thirty-two months, the EEOC determined that there
was “reasonable cause to believe the charge [was] true.”3 It then sent Asplundh
a proposed conciliation agreement, requiring a response within twelve business
days4—a very short period of time relative to the lengthy period of
investigation.
Notably, the proposed conciliation agreement demanded three remedies
that were not merely impracticable but impossible for Asplundh to perform.5
First, the EEOC demanded that Asplundh reinstate Lewis as a laborer even
though the project on which he had worked ended three years earlier and the
office for which he worked had closed.6 Second, the EEOC demanded that
Asplundh provide Lewis with front pay even though, again, the project on
which he had worked ended three years earlier and the office for which he
worked had closed.7 Third, the EEOC demanded that Asplundh conduct
nationwide antidiscrimination training for all its management and hourly
employees within ninety days even though the alleged discrimination occurred
only in the city of Gainesville, Florida.8
Moreover, the agency refused to reopen negotiations even though Asplundh
made clear that it had retained counsel and wished to settle the case.9 Perhaps
most objectionable of all, however, was the fact that Asplundh did not even

2 EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir. 2003). The charge also alleged
disparate pay and retaliation. Id. at 1257–58.
3 Id. at 1258 (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 Id. After receipt of the proposed conciliation agreement, Asplundh retained counsel. Id. Asplundh’s
counsel faxed a request to the EEOC investigator assigned to Lewis’s case, requesting both a telephone call
and an extension to respond to the proposed agreement until he and the EEOC investigator had an opportunity
to discuss the case. Id. The next day, without acknowledging the faxed request, the EEOC asserted that
conciliation had failed. Id. at 1258–59.
5 Id. at 1260.
6 See id. at 1258.
7 See id.
8 Id.
9 See id. at 1260–61.

DUNN GALLEYSPROOFS

458

1/21/2014 4:16 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:455

employ Evans.10 The EEOC provided no theory explaining how Asplundh
could possibly be liable.11
These facts from EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co. prompt a crucial
question: given that after the EEOC receives a charge of discrimination, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires the agency to attempt to conciliate
the charge with the private employer accused of discrimination before
initiating suit against it,12 what is the proper standard for reviewing whether the
agency has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate?
The answer to this question is more relevant than ever. The EEOC recently
released its Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016, which presents the
agency’s strategy for enforcing Title VII over the next few years.13 The EEOC
intends to focus its enforcement responsibilities on employers who allegedly
engage in systemic discrimination, defined as alleged discrimination with “a
broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic area.”14 By
2016, the agency aims to maintain a certain number of systemic discrimination
cases on its litigation docket, increasing the number of such cases each year
until that number is met.15 Importantly, as the agency increases the number of
systemic discrimination cases it chooses to litigate, the potential for the agency
to abuse its statutory duty to conciliate increases. That is, the agency has
greater incentive to engage in unreasonable conciliatory efforts similar to those
in Asplundh, effectively rendering its statutory duty to conciliate an empty
formality. Whether the plan warrants fear of such abuse depends, at least in
part, on what standard governs for reviewing whether the EEOC has satisfied
its statutory duty to conciliate.
In addressing the proper standard for reviewing whether the EEOC has
satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate, this Comment has five parts. Part I
provides background, contextualizing the EEOC’s statutory duty to conciliate
within the framework imposed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

10 See id. at 1260. Evans was an employee of the Gainesville Regional Utilities. Id. at 1257. Asplundh
had contracted with the GRU to dig ditches and lay cable. Id.
11 Id. at 1260.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (2006).
13 EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012–2016, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.
gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_12to16.pdf.
14 Id. at 14. In 2006, the EEOC adopted its Systemic Initiative, which first “[made] the identification,
investigation, and litigation of systemic discrimination cases . . . a top priority.” Id.
15 See id. at 12, 18–19. The agency has not yet determined how many systemic discrimination cases it
must maintain on its litigation docket. Id. at 12, 18.
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which created the EEOC and its concomitant duty to conciliate.16 Part II
discusses the current split in the federal circuit courts of appeals on the proper
standard for reviewing whether the agency has satisfied its duty to conciliate—
two circuits, the Sixth and the Tenth, argue for a deferential standard of
review17 while three others, the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh, argue for a
stringent standard.18 Part III critiques the deferential standard of review,
arguing that it cannot adequately protect private employers from the agency’s
potential abuse of its statutory duty to conciliate.19 Part IV argues that the
stringent standard of review is the proper standard not only because it lacks the
shortcomings of the deferential standard, but also because it is consistent with
the text, purpose, legislative history, and jurisprudence of Title VII. Finally,
Part V addresses resistance to adopting the stringent standard of review.
I. BACKGROUND
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.20
Toward that end, Title VII created the EEOC,21 the federal agency with
congressionally granted authority to not only receive, investigate, and
conciliate allegations of employment discrimination,22 but to enforce Title VII
against private employers who engage in discriminatory practices, whether
systemic or individualized, by initiating suit against them.23
16

See §§ 2000e-4(a)–(g), -5(b).
See EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533
(10th Cir. 1978).
18 See EEOC v. Agro Distribution LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Asplundh Tree
Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d
Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 18–19 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp.,
636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981); Nicholas J. Wagoner, More Percolation over Good Faith
Conciliation, CIRCUIT SPLITS (May 30, 2012, 6:19 AM), http://www.circuitsplits.com/2012/05/eliminatingdiscrimination-with-good-faith-conciliation.html.
19 This Comment discusses the effects the agency’s potential abuse of its statutory duty has on private
employers. Although others, including employees of those employers, would certainly feel the effects of any
agency abuse, those effects are beyond the scope of this Comment.
20 § 2000e-2. See DONALD R. LIVINGSTON, EEOC LITIGATION AND CHARGE RESOLUTION 3–9 (Charles
A. Shanor & Paul E. Mirengoff eds., 2005), for a brief history of the political compromises that preceded
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
21 § 2000e-4(a). See LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 9–24, for a brief history of the EEOC, a brief
overview of the statutes it enforces, and a brief overview of its functions in both the federal and private sectors.
22 See § 2000e-5(b).
23 See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Congress granted the EEOC authority to enforce Title VII by passing the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to that effect. See
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2002). The EEOC, however, has authority to initiate
17
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The EEOC’s administrative duties—the receipt, investigation, and
conciliation of allegations of employment discrimination—begin once an
aggrieved person, a party on behalf of an aggrieved person, or an EEOC
commissioner files a charge of employment discrimination with the agency.24
Upon receipt of a charge, the EEOC must serve the employer with notice of
it.25 This notice includes “the date, place and circumstances of the alleged”
employment discrimination.26 Then, the EEOC must investigate the charge.27
If the agency finds no reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it will
dismiss it.28 If, on the other hand, it does find reasonable cause to believe the
charge is true, it must attempt to eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice
through conciliation,29 a term not statutorily defined.30 The EEOC generally
begins the process of conciliation by inviting the employer to participate in
conciliation.31 In its invitation, the EEOC generally requests that the employer
contact the agency within a specified period of time to indicate whether it
would like to participate.32 Simultaneously with, or soon after the invitation,
the EEOC generally sends a proposed conciliation agreement to the
employer.33
The EEOC’s enforcement duties—the initiation of suit—may begin in one
of two circumstances. The EEOC may initiate suit against a private employer

litigation only against private employers and not against state or local governments, which the Attorney
General retains authority to sue. See § 2000e-5(f)(1).
24 See § 2000e-5(b). As the statute indicates in its enforcement provisions, state or local governments
may affect the process explained here, but the potential impact of state and local laws are beyond the scope of
this Comment. See id. § 2000e-5(c).
25 Id. § 2000e-5(b).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. The statute provides that “[i]f the Commission determines after such investigation that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.” Id.
Although, according to the statute, the agency must attempt to eliminate any alleged employment
discrimination through the use of three informal methods, these three methods have collapsed into the single
term of “conciliation.” See LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 428.
30 See § 2000e.
31 LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 431.
32 Id. at 432.
33 Id.
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if, first, the employer refuses to participate in conciliation34 or if, second, the
employer does agree to participate but conciliation fails.35
Within Title VII’s framework for the EEOC’s administrative and
enforcement duties, this Comment focuses on the agency’s statutory duty to
conciliate and argues that the proper standard for reviewing whether the
agency has satisfied this duty is the stringent standard of review.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although the EEOC’s “duty to conciliate is at the heart of Title VII,”36 the
federal circuit courts of appeals are split on the proper standard for reviewing
whether the agency has satisfied its duty to conciliate prior to initiating suit
against a private employer.37 Two circuits—the Sixth and Tenth—have
adopted a deferential standard of review that requires the EEOC to “make a
good faith effort to conciliate the claim” at issue.38 In contrast, three other
circuits—the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh—have adopted a stringent standard
of review that requires the agency to satisfy a three-pronged test that focuses
on “the reasonableness and responsiveness of the EEOC’s conduct under all
the circumstances.”39

34 EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1535 (2d Cir. 1996) (“If the defendant refuses the
invitation to conciliate . . . , the EEOC need not pursue conciliation and may proceed to litigate the question of
the employer’s liability for the alleged violations.”); LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 432.
35 See § 2000e-5(f)(1). The charging party may file suit in federal court against his employer if the EEOC
dismisses the charge or if the EEOC, within 180 days of the filing of the charge, has not conciliated the charge
or filed suit itself. See id.
36 EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
37 EEOC v. Alia Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1255 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting EEOC v. Timeless Invs.,
Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1052 (E.D. Cal. 2010)). This circuit split may grow even more divisive if the Ninth
Circuit, given the recent attention its district courts have given to the matter, issues its opinion on which
standard should govern. See id. at 1255–56; EEOC v. Evans Fruit Co., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1114 (E.D.
Wash. 2012). If, of course, the Ninth Circuit adopts the deferential standard of review, which many of its
district courts have done, then there would be an even division among six circuits between the two standards of
review. But see EEOC v. Cal. Psychiatric Transitions, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1114–15 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
(integrating both standards of review, suggesting that although the EEOC need only make a good faith effort at
conciliation as required by the deferential standard, the content of that good faith effort conforms to the threepronged test required by the stringent standard).
38 EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984); accord EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527,
533 (10th Cir. 1978).
39 Asplundh, 340 F.3d at 1259 (quoting EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit
A Feb. 1981)) (internal quotation mark omitted); accord EEOC v. Agro Distribution LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468
(5th Cir. 2009); Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d at 1534; EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 18–19 (2d
Cir. 1981).
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A. The Deferential Standard of Review
Two circuits—the Sixth and Tenth—have adopted a deferential standard of
review that requires the EEOC to “make a good faith effort to conciliate the
claim” at issue.40
The Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v. Keco Industries, Inc., explained that the
deferential standard turns not on whether the reviewing court is satisfied with
the EEOC’s attempt to conciliate, but, rather, on whether the EEOC made a
good faith effort to conciliate.41 In that case, a female employee filed a charge
of discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that her employer, Keco Industries,
Inc., discriminated against her because of her sex.42 The EEOC investigated
the charge and determined that there was reasonable cause to believe the
charge was true, finding wage differentials and job segregation between female
and male employees.43 For that reason, the EEOC prepared a proposed
conciliation agreement that addressed these findings, requiring Keco to make
all jobs available to both female and male employees unless gender proved a
legitimate qualification for a particular position.44 Keco rejected the
agreement.45 The court held that the agency had made a good faith effort to
conciliate, reasoning that, first, the reviewing court should not inquire into the
content of the agency’s efforts and, second, the agency need not make any
further efforts once an employer rejects its initial efforts.46 On the former
point, the court elaborated that “[t]he form and substance of those conciliations
is within the discretion of the EEOC as the agency created to administer and
enforce our employment discrimination laws and is beyond judicial review.”47
According to the court, a reviewing court “should only determine whether the
EEOC made an attempt at conciliation.”48
The Tenth Circuit has further explained the deferential standard.49 In EEOC
v. Zia Co., the court emphasized that “a [reviewing] court should not examine
the details of the offers and counteroffers between the parties, nor impose its

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Keco, 748 F.2d at 1102; accord Zia Co., 582 F.2d at 533.
748 F.2d at 1102.
Id. at 1098.
See id. at 1101.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1102.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978).
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notions of what the [conciliation] agreement should provide.”50 In Zia, the
EEOC investigated charges that Zia discriminated against its employees on the
basis of national origin.51 Once the agency substantiated the charges, it invited
Zia to participate in conciliation discussions.52 Conciliation, however, proved
difficult due to Zia’s contractual relationship with the Energy Research
Development Agency (ERDA), which required Zia to obtain the ERDA’s
approval of any conciliation agreement.53 The parties disagreed over
boilerplate language in the proposed conciliation agreement about the
consequences of failure to comply with the agreement’s terms.54 Eventually,
counsel for the ERDA asked its Office of General Counsel in Washington,
D.C., for aid in convincing the EEOC in Washington, D.C., to omit the
contested language.55 The Office of General Counsel failed to reach agreement
with the EEOC in D.C. and recommended signing the conciliation agreement
notwithstanding the contested language.56 By the time the ERDA gave Zia
permission to sign the agreement, the EEOC’s Denver Regional Litigation
Center was already considering whether to bring suit and though it later
authorized the litigation,57 it did offer to continue pursuing conciliatory
efforts.58 Conciliation failed when the EEOC’s trial attorney expanded the
scope of the negotiation and the litigation.59 The court held that the EEOC, at
the regional level, failed to make a good faith effort to conciliate the claims at
issue because the agency’s regional litigation officials acted inappropriately for
three reasons.60 First, at the time referral of the case was sent to the Denver
Regional Litigation Center, the officials knew, or should have known, that the
ERDA’s Office of General Counsel and the EEOC in D.C. were engaged in
negotiations.61 Second, the officials should have reasonably expected that,
given more time, conflict over the contested boilerplate language would have

50

Id.
Id. at 529.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 530. The contract provided that the ERDA would pay Zia any back pay settlement. Id.
54 See id.
55 See id. at 531. The ERDA had previously communicated with the EEOC’s district office in
Albuquerque. See id.
56 See id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 532.
60 See id. at 534.
61 Id.
51
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been resolved.62 Finally, the officials should not have escalated their demands
without new meetings and sufficient time to allow the ERDA to respond.63
The Zia case illustrates two relevant points. First, it illustrates that
“deference is not abdication.”64 Even though the Tenth Circuit applied the
deferential standard of review to the EEOC’s conciliatory efforts, it
nonetheless could—and did—find that the EEOC had not satisfied its statutory
duty to conciliate.65 Second, and more importantly, the case illustrates that
even if a reviewing court does not defer to the agency, the justification for not
deferring rests upon concerns with the process of conciliation and not the
substance of conciliation.66 Part III will discuss this distinction between the
process and substance of conciliation in more detail.
B. The Stringent Standard of Review
In contrast to the deferential standard of review, the stringent standard
requires the EEOC to satisfy a three-pronged test, which focuses on “the
reasonableness and responsiveness of the EEOC’s conduct under all the
circumstances” to assess whether it has complied with its statutory duty to
conciliate.67 More specifically, the EEOC must “(1) outline to the employer the
reasonable cause for its belief that Title VII has been violated; (2) offer an
opportunity for voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in a reasonable and
flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.”68 Three circuits—
the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh—have adopted the stringent standard of
review.69
The Second Circuit applied the stringent standard of review in EEOC v.
Johnson & Higgins, Inc.70 In that case, the EEOC found reasonable cause to
62

Id.
Id.
64 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
65 See Zia, 582 F.2d at 534.
66 See id. at 533.
67 EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981).
68 EEOC v. Agro Distribution LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2009).
69 See id. at 468; EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003); EEOC v.
Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14,
18–19 (2d Cir. 1981); Klingler, 636 F.2d at 107.
70 See 91 F.3d at 1534–35. Although the EEOC brought suit against the corporation to enforce not Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), see id.,
Congress has authorized the EEOC to exercise the same enforcement power the agency has under Title VII
when enforcing the ADEA’s prohibitions against employment discrimination on the basis of age, see 29
U.S.C. § 626(b) (2012) (providing that the EEOC must “attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice or
63
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believe that Johnson & Higgins, Inc., which implemented a mandatory
retirement policy that forced its directors to retire by age sixty-two,
discriminated on the basis of age.71 The agency invited the company to
participate in conciliation, but the company instead insisted that the agency
reconsider its position.72 In response, the agency outlined its procedures for
conciliation and requested that the company produce records of its former
directors’ salaries.73 The company again insisted that the agency reconsider
and, consequently, the EEOC brought suit.74 On appeal, the company argued
that the EEOC failed to comply with its statutory duty to conciliate.75 The
Second Circuit disagreed, finding that the agency satisfied the three-pronged
test: (1) the EEOC found reasonable cause for its determination that the charge
against the company was true, and it informed the company of its grounds for
cause; (2) it invited the company to participate in conciliation; and (3) it
reasonably responded to the company’s unreasonable persistence in arguing
that it did not violate the law.76 The court stated that, in this case, the EEOC
need not have done more than it did and held that the agency had satisfied its
statutory duty to conciliate.77
Johnson & Higgins, then, is to the stringent standard of review what Zia is
to the deferential standard. Although the Second Circuit applied the stringent
standard of review to the EEOC’s conciliatory efforts, it nonetheless could—
and did—find that the agency satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate.78
However, the employer’s unreasonable persistence in arguing that it did not
violate the law heavily influenced the court’s decision, suggesting perhaps that
the Second Circuit did not want to punish the agency for the employer’s
recalcitrance.79
The Fifth Circuit, in EEOC v. Klingler Electric Corp., highlighted the
differences between application of the stringent standard of review and the

practices alleged, and to effect voluntary compliance . . . through informal methods of conciliation, conference,
and persuasion” before it may proceed to litigation). The analysis of the EEOC’s duty to conciliate is the same,
then, under both statutes.
71 See Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d at 1532–33.
72 Id. at 1533.
73 Id.
74 See id.
75 Id. at 1534.
76 See id. at 1535.
77 Id.
78 See id.
79 See id.
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deferential.80 In that case, after investigating a charge of employment
discrimination filed against Klingler and determining that there was reasonable
cause to believe the charge was true, the EEOC initiated the conciliation
process.81 During conciliation, the agency sent Klingler an unsigned, proposed
conciliation agreement, which left an item blank because the agency needed
Klingler to fill it with the appropriate information.82 Klingler filled in the
blank, signed the agreement, and returned it to the EEOC.83 However, the
agency did not approve of Klingler’s response to the item left blank.84 The
EEOC made a counterproposal and, after Klingler “did not act upon the
proposal,”85 the EEOC announced that conciliation had failed.86 The Fifth
Circuit, on the issue of whether the agency satisfied its statutory duty to
conciliate, criticized the lower court’s analysis of the EEOC’s conciliation
efforts because that court essentially applied the deferential standard of
review.87 The lower court never ascertained what Klingler wrote in the item
left blank, it never ascertained what the EEOC demanded in its
counterproposal, and it never ascertained how Klingler responded to the
counterproposal.88 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the lower court could not
“make a proper evaluation without a more thorough inquiry into such relevant
facts of the conciliation negotiations.”89 According to the Fifth Circuit, then,
the stringent standard of review, unlike the deferential standard, essentially
requires the reviewing court to inquire about the “form and substance” of
conciliation and to “examine the details of the offers and counteroffers
between the parties.”90

80

See 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981).
Id. at 106.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See id.
85 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court emphasized that the record merely reflected that
“Klingler ‘did not act upon the proposal.’” See id.
86 Id.
87 See id. at 107 (“The district court apparently evaluated the EEOC’s conciliation effort without looking
beyond the face of the proposed conciliation agreement signed by Klingler.”).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Compare id. (“It was impossible . . . to make a proper evaluation without a more thorough inquiry into
[the] relevant facts . . . .”), with EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984) (“The district court
should only determine whether the EEOC made an attempt at conciliation. The form and substance of those
conciliations is within the discretion of the EEOC . . . .”), and EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir.
1978) (“[A] court should not examine the details of the offers and counteroffers between the parties . . . .”).
81
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Finally, returning to the case with which this Comment began, the Eleventh
Circuit applied the stringent standard of review in Asplundh and held that the
agency had not satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate.91 Recall the dramatic
facts of that case—Lewis alleged that he suffered racial discrimination when
another man crafted a noose from a piece of rope and placed it around Lewis’s
neck.92 Although the EEOC investigated Lewis’s claim for a lengthy period of
thirty-two months, once it finally decided that it wished to proceed to the
conciliatory phase, the agency sprinted forward, trampling upon Asplundh with
arbitrarily abrupt deadlines, unreasonably extensive demands, and prematurely
ceased negotiations.93 Specifically, the agency required Asplundh to respond to
its proposed conciliation agreement within twelve business days, the
conciliation agreement itself contained impracticable demands, and the agency
refused to reopen negotiations even though Asplundh made clear that it had
retained counsel and wished to settle the case.94 Reviewing these facts, the
Eleventh Circuit flatly declared that “it cannot be said that the EEOC acted in
good faith. In fact, its conduct ‘smacks more of coercion than of
conciliation.’”95
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
The deferential standard of review is not the proper standard for reviewing
whether the EEOC has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate. Because the
standard allows a reviewing court to examine only the process and not the
content of conciliation, the standard suffers from three shortcomings that allow
the agency to abuse its statutory duty to conciliate by circumventing
meaningful conciliatory efforts altogether. This Part discusses these three
shortcomings in turn.
First, because the deferential standard allows a reviewing court to examine
only the process and not the content of conciliation, the court’s analysis of the
EEOC’s conciliatory efforts is necessarily incomplete.96 That is, if the “form
91

See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1257.
93 See id. at 1258, 1260. The court imputed a self-interested motive to the EEOC’s haste in filing—the
case, after all, involved “lurid” allegations of racial discrimination that would draw media attention to the
agency, and anything said or done during conciliation, unlike litigation, cannot be made public. See id. at 1261
& n.3; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
94 See Asplundh, 340 F.3d at 1258–61.
95 Id. at 1260 (quoting EEOC v. Pet, Inc., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1980)).
96 The deferential standard of review implicitly requires the reviewing court to bifurcate the process and
content of conciliation before it may examine only the former and not the latter. This Part sets aside the
92
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and substance”97 of conciliation and the “details of the offers and counteroffers
between the parties”98 are beyond judicial review, any analysis of whether the
EEOC has made a good faith effort to conciliate with an employer cannot be a
complete one.
Consider, for instance, how a reviewing court would have applied the
deferential standard of review in Keco with a minor factual difference in that
case. Recall that in Keco, the Sixth Circuit mentioned an excerpt from the
proposed conciliation agreement between Keco and the EEOC,99 but it did not
meaningfully examine the excerpt when it decided in favor of the agency.100
Suppose that the excerpt contained impracticable and unreasonable demands
similar to those the EEOC made in Asplundh.101 Under the deferential
standard, they would amount to the substance and details of conciliation and,
as a consequence, they would remain beyond judicial review.102 The court
would still have found for the EEOC, and the decision, given the change in
facts, would be—or should be—troubling. To put the point another way, even
if the EEOC were to speak with an employer often, even if it were to meet with
an employer often, and even if it were to amend proposed conciliation
agreements often, none of these outward contributions to the process of
conciliation matter if the discussions, meetings, and agreements contained
content that did not evidence the agency’s genuine willingness to further
conciliation with the employer. If the agency may give the appearance of an
adequate process of conciliation while simultaneously impeding that process
with unreasonable substance and details, then the agency has the means to
evade fulfilling its statutory duty to conciliate.
Second, because the deferential standard allows a reviewing court to
examine only the process and not the content of conciliation, the standard
creates unintended incentives for the EEOC that run contrary to the heart of
Title VII.103 Consider again the hypothetical factual difference in Keco. Even if
the proposed conciliation agreement contained impracticable and unreasonable
demands, the court could rule in favor of the EEOC not only because the
difficulties inherent in bifurcation, another problem with the deferential standard, and assumes instead that the
court has determined how and where to draw the line between process and content.
97 EEOC v. Keco Indus., 748 F.2d 1097, 1102 (6th Cir. 1984).
98 EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978).
99 See 748 F.2d at 1101.
100 See id. at 1101–02.
101 See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
102 See Keco, 748 F.2d at 1102.
103 See Asplundh, 340 F.3d at 1260.
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demands amount to the substance and details of conciliation, but also because
Keco would reject the proposed agreement and, notably, rejection is a matter
of process, not content.104 Once an employer rejects a proposed agreement, the
EEOC need not attempt further conciliation efforts and may proceed
immediately to litigation.105 To rely on the deferential standard, then, is to give
the EEOC an incentive not only to draft proposed conciliation agreements with
objectionable demands insulated from judicial review, a point related to the
first shortcoming of the deferential standard, but also to give the agency an
incentive to draft such agreements in an effort to encourage their rejection and
thereby circumvent meaningful conciliatory efforts. To argue that these
unintended incentives are problematic assumes, of course, that the EEOC
prefers to litigate rather than conciliate. That assumption is grounded in the
EEOC’s Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016, which, as discussed in the
Introduction, describes the agency’s intent to maintain a certain number of
systemic discrimination cases on its litigation docket.106
Third, even if examination of the process of conciliation provided sufficient
protection from abuse, the depth of examination under the deferential standard
is too shallow to prove significant. In explaining the deferential standard, the
Sixth Circuit in Keco asserted that the reviewing court “should only determine
whether the EEOC made an attempt at conciliation.”107 Reading the words of
that opinion strictly, the standard arguably appears to turn not on whether the
EEOC made a good faith effort to conciliate, but on whether it made any effort
at all.108 Consider once more the hypothetical factual difference in Keco and,
this time, suppose further that the written proposed conciliation agreement with
objectionable demands was the only communication between the EEOC and
Keco during conciliation. If the EEOC need only make an attempt at
conciliation, then sending such a proposed agreement, without more, would
arguably satisfy its statutory duty to conciliate.
To the extent the deferential standard of review has been explained and
applied by the Sixth and the Tenth Circuits, it cannot be the proper standard for
104 See Keco, 748 F.2d at 1101–02. If Keco rejected the proposed conciliation agreement in the actual
case, it would likely reject a proposed agreement like the one in Asplundh. See id. at 1101; Asplundh, 340 F.3d
at 1258.
105 Keco, 748 F.2d at 1101–02.
106 EEOC, supra note 13, at 12, 18–19.
107 748 F.2d at 1102 (emphasis added).
108 See id.; see also EEOC v. Swissport Fueling, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1037 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“[T]he
Sixth and Tenth Circuits have taken a more deferential approach that looks only at the EEOC’s attempt to
conciliate without delving deeply into the substance of that attempt.”).
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reviewing whether the EEOC has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate.
Because the standard allows a reviewing court to examine only the process and
not the content of conciliation, it suffers from the three shortcomings
discussed, which allow the agency to abuse its statutory duty to conciliate by
circumventing meaningful conciliatory efforts altogether.
IV. THE STRINGENT STANDARD OF REVIEW IS THE PROPER STANDARD
The stringent standard of review is the proper standard for reviewing
whether the EEOC has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate. As discussed in
Part II, it requires the EEOC to satisfy a three-pronged test that focuses on “the
reasonableness and responsiveness of the EEOC’s conduct under all the
circumstances.”109 The three-pronged test requires the EEOC to “(1) outline to
the employer the reasonable cause for its belief that Title VII has been
violated; (2) offer an opportunity for voluntary compliance; and (3) respond in
a reasonable and flexible manner to the reasonable attitudes of the
employer.”110
The stringent standard of review is the proper standard for two reasons: (1)
it has a strength the deferential standard lacks—it requires the reviewing court
to examine both the process and content of conciliation, and (2) it is consistent
with the text, purpose, legislative history, and jurisprudence of Title VII. As
Part II discussed how the stringent standard of review requires the reviewing
court to examine both the process and content of conciliation, this Part argues
that adopting the standard is consistent with the text, purpose, legislative
history, and jurisprudence of Title VII.
A. The Text of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Is Consistent with
Adopting the Stringent Standard of Review
Although the plain language of Title VII does not identify any standard for
reviewing whether the EEOC has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate,111
the statutory text is nonetheless consistent with adopting the stringent standard

109
110
111

EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb. 1981).
EEOC v. Agro Distribution LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2009).
EEOC v. Hometown Buffet, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
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of review already adopted by the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit courts of
appeals.112
The statutory text is consistent with adopting the stringent standard of
review because it noticeably fails to state that any part of the EEOC’s
congressionally granted authority is beyond judicial review.113 First, in
addressing a charge of discrimination, the statute provides that the EEOC must
serve notice of the charge on the employer, and it permits the agency to
determine the substance and form of the notice—the charge “shall contain such
information and be in such form as the Commission requires.”114 Second, in
addressing the investigation of a charge, the statute allows the agency to
determine whether to dismiss or pursue a charge of discrimination—“[i]f the
Commission determines . . . that there is not reasonable cause to believe that
the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge,”115 but if, on the other hand, “the
Commission determines . . . that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged
unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.”116 Finally, in addressing the conciliation
agreement that may follow a charge, the statute provides the EEOC with the
authority to deny or approve a conciliation agreement—if the agency cannot
secure “a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission,” the agency
may then initiate suit against the employer.117
Now, one may argue that analysis of the statutory treatment of the EEOC’s
administrative obligations—its duty to notify employers of the charges against
them, its duty to investigate charges, and its duty to conciliate charges—
appears to support adopting the deferential standard of review rather than the
stringent standard. Analysis suggests that, upon reading the relevant provisions
collectively, Congress vested the agency with substantial authority to act in its
discretion such that a reviewing court should not interfere with that discretion
112 See Agro, 555 F.3d at 468; EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003);
EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 650
F.2d 14, 18–19 (2d Cir. 1981); Klingler, 636 F.2d at 107.
113 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006).
114 Id. § 2000e-5(b).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The conciliation agreement must be “acceptable to the Commission” whether the
employer is “a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.” Id. The only difference in the case
of an employer that is “a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision” is the agency’s duty to
refer the case to the Attorney General, who may choose whether to file a case against the respondent in the
appropriate district court. Id.
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unless the agency fails to act in good faith.118 The statutory text, after all,
seems to focus on what the EEOC—and not what any other entity—requires,
determines, and accepts.119 It grants the agency the power to decide when to
proceed to each step in the administrative process and when, moreover, to
move from the administrative process into a courtroom.120
However, arguing that the EEOC retains congressionally granted authority
to perform the administrative tasks necessary to prevent unlawful employment
practices, and arguing that, in particular, the EEOC retains authority to accept
or deny a conciliation agreement, does not significantly contribute to the
discussion about whether the EEOC has satisfied its statutory duty to
conciliate. First, although the statute permits the agency to determine the
substance and form of notice, it simultaneously requires the agency to include
the date, place, and circumstances of the alleged discrimination within the
notice.121 Second, although the statute allows the agency to determine whether
there is reasonable cause to believe the charge of discrimination is true, the
agency’s authority remains cabined by the mandates of reasonableness.122 As
discussed in Part III, the deferential standard of review theoretically allows the
EEOC to behave unreasonably and, thus, that standard is inconsistent with the
statutory text.123 Finally, although the statute allows the agency to determine
whether a conciliation agreement is acceptable,124 that certainly cannot mean
that the agency may include whatever it pleases within the agreement without
the check of judicial review.125
In the absence of plain language that suggests that the EEOC’s
congressionally granted authority is beyond judicial review, and in a statutory
scheme that suggests that the EEOC cannot rationally retain authority to
impose unreasonable demands upon employers, the text of Title VII is
consistent with adopting the stringent standard of review.

118 See id. § 2000e-5(b). In addressing the EEOC’s authority to issue regulations, the statute also allows
the agency “to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of this
subchapter.” Id. § 2000e-12(a).
119 See id. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1).
120 See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
121 See id. § 2000e-5(b).
122 See id.
123 See supra Part III.
124 See § 2000e-5(f)(1).
125 See supra Part III.
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B. The Purpose of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Is Consistent with
Adopting the Stringent Standard of Review
The purpose of Title VII is to prohibit employers from discriminating on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.126 To effect this
purpose, Title VII imposes a framework that encourages conciliation in lieu of
litigation.127 Similarly, to effect the purpose of Title VII, the stringent standard
of review imposes a framework—its three-pronged test—that encourages
conciliation.128 For that reason, the purpose of Title VII is consistent with
adopting the stringent standard of review.
Title VII’s framework encourages conciliation through its many provisions
on conciliation including, for example, the statute’s confidentiality
provisions.129 Congress foresaw that confidentiality would prove a critical
issue for both the EEOC and employers during the conciliatory process.130
Each may have valid reasons for avoiding conciliation for fear that anything
revealed would then become available for public disclosure.131 Therefore, to
encourage conciliation, Title VII provides that “[n]othing said or done during
and as a part of [the conciliatory process] may be made public by the
Commission, its officers or employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent
proceeding without the written consent of the persons concerned.”132
The stringent standard of review similarly imposes a framework that
encourages conciliation in the form of its three-pronged test. The first prong,
which requires the EEOC to explain to the employer the reasonable cause for
its belief that the employer violated Title VII,133 encourages conciliation by
126

See § 2000e-2(a)–(d).
See id. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974)
(“Cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving [the purpose of
Title VII].”). Title VII, however, does not contemplate that the agency should never pursue litigation. See
§ 2000e-5(f)(1). Indeed, as a matter of institutional organization, the agency’s General Counsel independently
directs the Office of the General Counsel, which implements the agency’s litigation program. See 2 BARBARA
T. LINDEMANN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. 26.I.A (5th ed. 2012). If all cases were to
conciliate, there would be no need for the litigation program at all. And although, arguably, EEOC litigators
have perverse incentives to ensure conciliation fails, that issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
128 See EEOC v. Agro Distribution LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2009).
129 See § 2000e-5(b).
130 See LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 441.
131 See id.
132 § 2000e-5(b). Moreover, the statute provides consequences for violating the confidentiality
provisions—“[a]ny person who makes public information in violation of this subsection shall be fined not
more than $1,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.” Id.
133 Agro, 555 F.3d at 468.
127
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providing a foundation of shared information from which the parties may begin
negotiations. The second prong, which requires the EEOC to offer the
employer “an opportunity for voluntary compliance,”134 encourages
conciliation by allowing the employer to avoid potentially costly litigation and
public exposure.135 The third prong, which requires the EEOC to respond
reasonably and flexibly “to the reasonable attitudes of the employer,”136
encourages conciliation by serving as a reminder that a judicial check exists for
both the EEOC and the employer.137
Now if Title VII truly aims to impose a framework that encourages
conciliation in lieu of litigation, one might wonder why Congress vested the
EEOC with the authority to bring suit at all. In originally enacting Title VII,
Congress hoped that employers would comply with the statute voluntarily.138
That hope, however, proved far too optimistic.139 In the EEOC’s fifth annual
report, for fiscal year 1970, the agency determined that it successfully
conciliated only 342 cases, which amounted to less than fifteen percent of the
cases it designated for conciliation.140 Whatever the reason for the EEOC’s
failure to conciliate a significant number of cases,141 Congress ultimately chose
to strengthen the agency’s administrative and enforcement authority by
enacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 to amend Title
VII.142 In enacting the amendment, however, Congress did not abandon its
hope that the EEOC and employers would engage in successful conciliation,
evidenced by Congress’s retention of the EEOC’s statutory duty to
conciliate.143 Thus, the agency’s duty to conciliate is not harmed but helped by
its authority to bring suit—Congress realized that the inability of the EEOC to
134

Id.
See LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 441. To be sure, the second prong encourages settlement to the
extent that the employer believes the charge against it has merit. See id.
136 Agro, 555 F.3d at 468.
137 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1974). Title VII provides the EEOC with
only indirect enforcement authority. See id. In other words, the agency may bring suit, but it cannot adjudicate
claims or impose administrative sanctions. Id. Rather, the federal courts have direct enforcement authority for
ensuring compliance with Title VII. See id.
138 EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984).
139 Id.
140 118 CONG. REC. 3804 (1972) (statement of Sen. James Allen).
141 Senator James Browning Allen of Alabama, one of the Senators most outspoken in his criticism of the
EEOC, argued that the agency’s dismal conciliation record was due to its own inadequacies. See id. During the
debates on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, he insisted “that only a very low percentage of
conciliation failures with Alabama employers is due to the latter’s recalcitrance. . . . [C]onciliation will work,
given a fair opportunity, if, and when, the EEOC seriously and sincerely ‘gets with it.’” Id. at 3804–05.
142 See Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 61–63.
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(2006).
135
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enforce Title VII was a “serious defect,” making the agency nothing more than
a “toothless tiger.”144 To wield potential litigation before an employer is to
remind it that successful conciliation is in its interest.
The purpose of Title VII is consistent with adopting the stringent standard
of review, which encourages the EEOC and employers to reach successful
conciliation.
C. The Legislative History of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Is
Consistent with Adopting the Stringent Standard of Review
The legislative history of Title VII demonstrates congressional distrust of
the EEOC and the consequent need for meaningful judicial review of the
agency’s actions. This section discusses two prominent debates in the
legislative history of Title VII: (1) the debate on whether to grant the EEOC
cease-and-desist authority and (2) the debate on whether to retain statutory
language that would preclude a court from reviewing the agency’s
determination that a conciliation agreement is unacceptable. The outcome of
both debates is consistent with adopting the stringent standard of review.
The debate on whether to grant the EEOC cease-and-desist authority dates
back to the agency’s beginnings.145 Prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Congress initially modeled the agency after the National Labor Relations
Board, which did have cease-and-desist authority.146 However, Republicans in
Congress vehemently resisted granting the EEOC that authority and,
ultimately, they prevailed.147 Then, prior to passage of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, the debate resurfaced and, again, Republicans in
Congress resisted granting the EEOC cease-and-desist authority and, again,
they prevailed.148 Because the agency had “attained an image as an advocate
for civil rights,” Congress was wary of allowing a mission-based agency,

144 See Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 671, 677 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 See Richard K. Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK.
L. REV. 62, 64–68 (1964) (discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Rebecca Hanner
White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency’s Leading
Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 59.
146 See Berg, supra note 145, at 64–65 (discussing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964);
White, supra note 145, at 59.
147 See Berg, supra note 145, at 65–67.
148 See LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 10.

DUNN GALLEYSPROOFS

476

1/21/2014 4:16 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:455

which could become overzealous in the pursuit of its goals, the power to act as
“investigator, prosecutor, and judge.”149
The debate on whether to retain statutory language that would preclude a
court from reviewing the agency’s determination that a conciliation agreement
is unacceptable began prior to passage of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972.150 The contentious statutory language provided that “[i]f the
Commission determines after attempting to secure voluntary compliance under
subsection (b) that it is unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, [that] determination shall not be
reviewable in any court.”151
Perhaps the provision’s harshest critic was Senator Samuel James Ervin,
Jr., of North Carolina, who particularly opposed the clause that would insulate
the agency’s determination on whether a conciliation agreement was
acceptable from judicial review.152 He argued that the clause would give “five
bureaucrats, who are elected by nobody to do anything and who are
responsible to nobody on the face of the earth, powers greater than those that
the courts and the laws of the United States impose on the office of
President.”153 In his opinion, the clause would give the EEOC “absolute power,
with no review except the sort of kangaroo proceeding imposed on the courts,
which are denied the right to find according to what the evidence states is
probably true.”154 Elaborating on Senator Ervin’s distrust of the EEOC and the
need for meaningful judicial review, Senator James Browning Allen of
Alabama argued that the clause was “typical of the arrogance of the
Commission,”155 and that, instead of conferring additional authority to the
EEOC, Congress should “sharply remind the Commission of its statutory
obligation to attempt to conciliate every appropriate case.”156
Senator Ervin and Senator Allen’s objections highlighted the danger of
granting the EEOC the authority to determine whether a conciliation
agreement is acceptable in the absence of judicial review. As passed, their

149

White, supra note 145, at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See 118 CONG. REC. 3799–800 (1972) (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin).
151 Id. at 3799.
152 See id. at 3799–800.
153 Id. at 3799. The EEOC is composed of five members, who are appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate for a term of five years each. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2006).
154 118 CONG. REC. 3800 (1972) (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin).
155 Id. at 3803 (statement of Sen. James Allen).
156 Id. at 3805.
150
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objections prevailed—the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 did not
incorporate the clause on immunity from judicial review.157 The senatorial
debates, then, support the stringent standard of review, which imposes
requirements upon the agency that address congressional distrust of the
agency’s judgment and the need for meaningful judicial review.
One may argue that, on the contrary, the legislative history supports the
deferential standard of review. In the same debate, the Senate attempted to
craft the language of the amending statute to create a standard of conciliation
that depended not on approval by the EEOC, but instead on existing law.158 As
mentioned, a prior draft of Title VII included the following provision: “If the
Commission determines after attempting to secure voluntary compliance under
subsection (b) that it is unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission . . . .”159 Senator Ervin argued that
the provision should instead read as follows: “If the Commission determines
that it is unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement
complying with the law . . . .”160 He adamantly emphasized that if the provision
did not change, the statute would promote the capricious policies of the EEOC
rather than justice—assuming, of course, that the two are not one and the
same.161 Yet, as passed, the provision reads almost identical to the one Senator
Ervin declared subject to the “whims and caprices of the Commission.”162 That
is, as passed, the provision reflects congressional support of deference to the
EEOC notwithstanding the senatorial arguments that stressed the possibility of
agency abuse.
This argument would have been convincing had the clause “shall not be
reviewable in any court” remained. Even if the agency engages in abusive
conciliatory efforts like those in Asplundh,163 the agency cannot act merely
according to its “whims and caprices” without facing sanctions by the courts.
The legislative history of Title VII is consistent with adopting the stringent
standard of review. The outcomes of two prominent debates in the legislative
history of the statute demonstrate congressional distrust of the EEOC and the
consequent need for meaningful judicial review of the agency’s actions, which
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

See § 2000e.
See 118 CONG. REC. 3799 (1972) (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
Id.; see § 2000e-5(f)(1).
See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).

DUNN GALLEYSPROOFS

478

1/21/2014 4:16 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:455

the stringent standard provides by requiring a reviewing court to examine both
the process and content of conciliation.
D. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Deference to the EEOC Is
Consistent with Adopting the Stringent Standard of Review
Just as the text, purpose, and legislative history of Title VII are consistent
with adopting the stringent standard of review, so, too, is the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on deference to the EEOC.
Although perhaps counterintuitive to argue that adopting the stringent
standard of review, rather than the deferential, is consistent with the Court’s
jurisprudence on deference to the EEOC, critical is the fact that the Court
issues opinions along a deference “continuum.”164 This continuum ranges from
the antideference regime, which begins with a presumption against deferring to
an agency’s interpretation of a statute as, for example, in cases involving penal
statutes, to the strongest deference regime, which, in contrast, begins with a
presumption for deferring as in cases involving military and foreign policy.165
In the modern administrative state, where Congress delegates legislative power
to agencies,166 the bulk of federal law derives from agency rules, guidelines,
opinions, and manuals.167 Consequently, courts frequently confront the
deference continuum, asking whether to defer to agencies at all and, if so, how
much deference to confer.168
Now there is an important distinction to bear in mind before turning to this
section’s argument—for courts to apply a deference regime to an agency’s
interpretation of a statute is not necessarily to defer to the agency.169 A
deference regime is merely a framework that courts use to evaluate an
164 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1098 (2008).
165 See id. at 1098–100; see also Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1727, 1737 (2010). Eskridge and Baer identify seven deference regimes, but this section will focus on the
regimes crafted in Chevron and Skidmore because those are the regimes most relevant for the EEOC. See
Eskridge & Baer, supra note 164, at 1098–100. Most of the other deference regimes Eskridge and Baer
identify apply only in narrow circumstances. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1246 n.61 (2007).
166 See Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the
ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1537–39 (1999), for a
discussion on the problem of whether Congress may delegate legislative power.
167 Raso & Eskridge, supra note 165, at 1730.
168 Id.
169 See id. at 1736.
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agency’s interpretation.170 Theoretically, then, when a court applies a highly
deferential regime such as that the Court crafted in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,171 it will uphold a larger number of
agency interpretations than it would if it were to apply a less deferential regime
such as that in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.172
This section argues that although the Court’s jurisprudence on deference to
agencies is unpredictable,173 the Court nonetheless exhibits a pattern of
conferring considerably less deference to the EEOC than it does to other
agencies and, therefore, its jurisprudence on deference to the EEOC is
consistent with adopting the stringent standard of review.174
1. The Court’s Jurisprudence on Deference to Administrative Agencies
The Court’s jurisprudence on deference to agencies is unpredictable—the
Court treats the deference regimes along the deference continuum as canons of
statutory construction and not as binding precedents.175 Treating the deference
regimes as canons allows the Court to apply the regimes periodically rather
than systematically such that the regimes themselves effectively become mere
factors the Court evaluates alongside many other factors.176 These other factors
may include the ideologies of each Justice, the Court’s expressed policies
underlying deference, and the preferences of Congress and the President.177
Yet even if the Court applies the deference regimes along the continuum
unpredictably, a brief review of a couple of those regimes is necessary to
appreciate the anomalous pattern of lesser deference that emerges for the
EEOC. Specifically, this subsection will focus on two positions on the
continuum, namely, those occupied by Chevron and Skidmore.178

170

Id.
See 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
172 See 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1944); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 165, at 1736.
173 See Raso & Eskridge, supra note 165, at 1766.
174 See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1937, 1937 (2006); Wern, supra note 166, at 1550.
175 Raso & Eskridge, supra note 165, at 1734.
176 Id. at 1734–35.
177 Id. at 1734. Scholars have offered many theories to explain what motivates judicial behavior. See, e.g.,
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 122–24 (1997) (arguing that there is considerable room
for debate on why judges choose the positions they ultimately adopt because of the inherent difficulty in
understanding human behavior).
178 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 255–56 (2006), for a summary of the “familiar principles” that
guide the Court’s deference doctrine.
171
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The more deferential regime of the two, Chevron, requires a reviewing
court to engage in a two-step analysis when evaluating an agency’s
interpretation of law.179 First, the court must determine whether the meaning of
the statutory language at issue is unambiguous.180 If so, the analysis need not
proceed further—the court and the agency must effectuate Congress’s
unambiguous intent.181 But if the statutory language is ambiguous or silent, the
court must proceed to the second step and determine whether the agency’s
interpretation is a permissible one.182 If so, the court must defer to the agency
notwithstanding the fact that, if given the opportunity, the court would have
chosen a different interpretation.183
More significant than Chevron’s two-step analysis, however, is how the
case expanded the boundaries of judicial deference through its distinction
between explicit and implicit delegations of authority.184 “If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,” then “there is an express delegation
of authority to the agency,” and any regulations the agency promulgates are
afforded “controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.”185 Moreover, if Congress implicitly left a gap, then a
reviewing court cannot substitute its own construction of the relevant statutory
provision in place of an agency’s reasonable interpretation.186 In short, whether
Congress explicitly or implicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, a reviewing
court must defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of the statute.187
Now on to the Skidmore deference regime. The Court has emphasized that
the Chevron deference regime applies only “when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority.”188 Otherwise, the Skidmore regime applies—the
agency’s interpretation is “entitled to respect” to the extent that it has the
“power to persuade.”189 In evaluating whether the agency’s interpretation has

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
See id. at 842.
Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 843.
See id. at 844.
See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 165, at 1242.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
Id. at 844.
See id. at 843–44.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).

DUNN GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

1/21/2014 4:16 PM

NO LONGER A PAPER TIGER

481

the power to persuade, a reviewing court must consider the thoroughness of the
agency’s consideration, the validity of the agency’s reasoning, the
interpretation’s consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and any
other relevant factors.190 The Skidmore regime applies to a variety of agency
interpretations, including enforcement guidelines and agency manuals.191
Because agencies make rules carrying the force of law through notice-andcomment rulemaking and adjudication less often than they issue guidelines and
manuals, the Skidmore regime applies more often than the Chevron regime.192
This subsection focused on the Chevron and Skidmore deference regimes,
two positions on the deference continuum, to lay the foundation for the
following subsection. As explained, the Court’s jurisprudence on deference to
administrative agencies is unpredictable because the Court treats deference
regimes like canons of statutory construction rather than binding precedents.193
For instance, a study by Professor Thomas Merrill that analyzed Supreme
Court cases involving agency interpretation of a statute found that the Court
did not apply Chevron consistently: though Chevron “purports to describe a
universal standard by which to determine whether to follow an administrative
interpretation of a statute, the two-step framework has been used in only about
one-third of the total post-Chevron cases in which one or more Justices
recognized that a deference question was presented.”194
2. The Court’s Jurisprudence on Deference to the EEOC
Although, overall, the Court’s jurisprudence on deference to administrative
agencies is unpredictable, the Court has exhibited an anomalous pattern of
applying the less deferential Skidmore regime to the EEOC’s interpretations of
Title VII.195 This pattern is consistent with adopting the stringent standard for
reviewing whether the agency has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate.
As discussed in the previous subsection, whether the more deferential
Chevron regime or the less deferential Skidmore regime applies to the EEOC’s
interpretation of Title VII turns on whether Congress delegated to the EEOC
the authority to make rules carrying the force of law with respect to Title
190

Id.
Hart, supra note 174, at 1941.
192 Id.; see also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1109–10 (2001).
193 Raso & Eskridge, supra note 165, at 1734.
194 Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 982 (1992).
195 See Hart, supra note 174, at 1937; Wern, supra note 166, at 1550.
191
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VII.196 It did not.197 In Title VII, Congress expressly delegated to the EEOC
only the authority to issue procedural rules,198 and the Court has since
interpreted Title VII as thereby denying the agency the power to engage in
rulemaking.199 Pursuant to its limited authority, the agency has indeed
interpreted its statutory duty to conciliate, issuing a regulation that provides
that “[i]n conciliating a case in which a determination of reasonable cause has
been made, the Commission shall attempt to achieve a just resolution of all
violations found and to obtain agreement that the respondent will eliminate the
unlawful employment practice and provide appropriate affirmative relief.”200
Presumably, the less deferential Skidmore regime would apply to this
interpretation given not only the analysis in the previous subsection, but also
the Court’s general treatment of the EEOC and its other interpretations.
As a general matter, the Court confers less deference to the EEOC than it
does to other administrative agencies.201 In the same study by Professor Merrill
mentioned in the previous subsection, empirical data on the Court’s deference
to all administrative agencies pre- and post-Chevron indicated that the average
deference rate was approximately seventy-two percent.202 In a later study that
built upon Professor Merrill’s statistics, empirical data on the Court’s
deference to only the EEOC indicated an average deference rate of
approximately fifty-four percent.203
When the Court considers cases involving the EEOC’s statutory
interpretations, it applies the Skidmore regime more often than Chevron, which

196

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2006).
198 See id.; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
199 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights
Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 682 (1991).
200 29 C.F.R. § 1601.24(a) (2009).
201 See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Wern,
supra note 166, at 1549.
202 See Merrill, supra note 194, at 981–82 (noting that, pre-Chevron, the agency view was accepted 34 out
of 45 times, while post-Chevron, the agency view was accepted 63 out of 90 times, resulting in a total from
both pre- and post-Chevron of 97 out of 135 times for a total average deference rate of approximately 72%);
Wern, supra note 166, at 1547, 1549. Merrill conducted the study on Supreme Court deference to all agencies.
See Merrill, supra note 194, at 981 n.51. Wern then used Merrill’s statistics as a baseline against which he
could compare the Court’s deference to all agencies to its deference to the EEOC. See Wern, supra note 166,
at 1547, 1549.
203 Wern, supra note 166, at 1549–50. Notably, Wern addressed the limitations of his statistical analysis,
particularly the small sample size he used to calculate the Court’s deference rate to the agency. See id. at 1550.
But even if his analysis is not wholly accurate, it does suggest disproportionately less deference to the EEOC.
See id.
197
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may explain the disproportionality.204 In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, for
example, the Court considered EEOC guidelines.205 At issue was whether a
corporation’s refusal to pay disability benefits for time lost due to pregnancy
and childbirth discriminated against female employees in violation of Title
VII.206 The EEOC guidelines provided that disabilities related to pregnancy,
miscarriage, abortion, and childbirth were temporary disabilities that required
the same benefits as other temporary disabilities.207 Applying Skidmore, the
Court reasoned that because the EEOC issued the guidelines in conflict with its
previous interpretations of Title VII, the guidelines lacked the “power to
persuade.”208 Then, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., the Court again
applied Skidmore and again rejected the agency’s interpretation.209 At issue
was whether Title VII applied “extraterritorially to regulate the employment
practices of [American] employers who employ [U.S.] citizens abroad.”210
According to the EEOC, Title VII did in fact apply as it stated in a letter from
its General Counsel, testimony by its Chairman, and a decision it issued.211
Like in Gilbert, the Court reasoned that the EEOC’s latest position was
inconsistent with its previous interpretation of the statute and, thus,
unpersuasive.212
The Court has exhibited a pattern of applying the less deferential Skidmore
regime to the EEOC’s interpretations of Title VII.213 It has demonstrated a
“lack of respect” for the EEOC214 and has thereby relegated the EEOC to the
fringes of administrative law as a “second class agency.”215 Because the Court
has indicated that the EEOC is not entitled to the deference normally conferred

204

See Hart, supra note 174, at 1945.
See 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
206 Id. at 129.
207 Id. at 140–41 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975)).
208 See id. at 141–43.
209 See 499 U.S. 244, 257–58 (1991).
210 Id. at 246.
211 Id. at 257.
212 See id. at 257–58. The presumption against the extraterritorial application of laws also influenced the
Court’s analysis, and it concluded that “the EEOC’s interpretation is insufficiently weighty to overcome the
presumption against extraterritorial application.” Id. at 258.
213 See Hart, supra note 174, at 1937. Oddly, in a case decided between Gilbert and Arabian American
Oil, the Court said that “the EEOC’s interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to be
entitled to deference.” EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988) (emphasis added).
However, the Court in Arabian American Oil did not even mention that case in its decision. Arabian Am. Oil,
499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring).
214 Hart, supra note 174, at 1937.
215 Wern, supra note 166, at 1550 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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upon other administrative agencies,216 the Court’s jurisprudence on deference
to the EEOC is consistent with adopting the stringent standard for reviewing
whether the agency has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate.
V. RESISTANCE TO ADOPTING THE STRINGENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
While recognizing that the deferential standard of review has its
shortcomings, some may resist adopting the stringent standard of review in its
stead. Rather, they argue that there are other avenues for remedying the
deferential standard’s shortcomings. This Part addresses two of these avenues,
both of which begin with the premise that the EEOC has abused its statutory
duty to conciliate. The first avenue focuses on legislative oversight, arguing
that the current split among the federal circuit courts of appeals highlights an
oddly narrow judicial vision of how to ensure that the EEOC satisfies its
statutory duty to conciliate. The second avenue focuses on an employer’s
ability to argue its case on the merits. This Part then argues that both avenues
fail to appreciate the paramount nature of the agency’s statutory duty to
conciliate.
A. Legislative Oversight
The first avenue for remedying the deferential standard of review’s
shortcomings focuses on the legislative oversight of agencies, which,
according to Richard Posner, “is too little emphasized.”217 The EEOC, after all,
exists within a tripartite governmental system and, consequently, it is
susceptible to significant legislative oversight that materializes through
appropriations subcommittees, among other formal and informal methods of
influence.
Congress, through its appropriations subcommittees, has means to
influence the EEOC in a way unavailable to the courts—only Congress retains
the “power of the purse.”218 The EEOC, like any other agency, needs money to
216

See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 338 (1974);
cf. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 70 (2006) (“[T]he level of
[congressional] oversight is high enough that it is incorrect to assert that Congress abdicates its responsibility
when it delegates discretion to those administering the law.”).
218 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION 474 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Beermann, supra note 217, at 85 (“As a practical matter, in a
disagreement between Congress and the President over the priorities or the value of a particular program,
Congress will win if it uses its power over the allocation of funds.”).
217
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operate, and it certainly cares about whether Congress will decrease, preserve,
or increase its annual budget.219 That is, “government agencies must go to their
capital markets—the legislative appropriations committees—every year. There
is competition among agencies for the largest possible slice of the
appropriations pie, and the agency that has a reputation for economy and hard
work enjoys an advantage in the competition.”220 In its congressional budget
justification for fiscal year 2013, the EEOC requested a budget of
$373,711,000, which is an increase of $13,711,000 from its fiscal year 2012
appropriation.221 With its “power of the purse,” Congress may exert influence
over the EEOC in at least four distinct ways.222
First, in allocating to the EEOC its annual appropriation, Congress may use
appropriations riders, which it regularly uses to supervise, if not control, the
activities of federal agencies.223 These appropriations riders usually specify a
regulatory action that Congress does not want executed and will then “prohibit
the expenditure of funds for carrying out” that specified action.224 Second,
rather than using appropriations riders, Congress may earmark funds, which is
a tactic that amounts to “the converse of riders.”225 When Congress earmarks
funds, it specifies a regulatory action that it wants executed and will then mark
the expenditure of funds for carrying out that specified action.226 For the
protection of employers, powerful members of Congress often secure funds for
the pursuit of business objectives in their districts.227 Here, Congress may
specify that although it would like the EEOC to pursue litigation when
necessary, it will expend a smaller budget for that purpose, forcing the EEOC
219

See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 218, at 474.
Posner, supra note 217, at 338.
221 EEOC, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 1 (2012). In the report, the chair of the
EEOC, Jacqueline A. Berrien, writes in support of the increased budgetary request:
220

[The EEOC’s] . . . progress is fragile. Given the agency’s varied enforcement responsibilities [it
is] constantly challenged to meet the growing public demand for the services [it] provide[s].
EEOC staff has worked to improve operations, provide better service to the public, and more
effectively and efficiently enforce the federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination, and
[it] will continue to do so.
Id. at 2.
222 See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 218, at 474 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Beermann, supra note 217, at 84 (“The power of the purse is among Congress’s most potent weapons in its
effort to control the execution of the laws.”).
223 See Beermann, supra note 217, at 85.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 89.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 90.
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to engage in conciliation efforts that respect business goals. Third, particular
members of Congress who have exceptional influence over the agency’s
budget may exert their individual influence on the appropriations
subcommittees.228 This manner of exerting influence over the EEOC focuses
on the political clout of individual members of Congress, who will retaliate or
reward the agency as they deem appropriate.229 Fourth and finally, Congress
may increase or decrease the overall budget it awards to the EEOC.230 If
Congress wants the EEOC to enforce Title VII more aggressively, it may
increase the agency’s budget.231 If, on the other hand, Congress wants the
EEOC to enforce its statutory obligations less aggressively, it will decrease the
agency’s budget.232
Admittedly, the EEOC is susceptible to significant legislative oversight,
and employers dissatisfied with the agency’s conciliatory efforts may seek
recourse by lobbying for congressional action in their favor. Yet this avenue
assumes that the EEOC has already failed to comply with its statutory duty to
conciliate, thereby brushing aside the agency’s failure to respect the heart of
Title VII to the detriment of private employers.233 If conciliation is to be
elevated above litigation, then the means to ensure its elevation, to the furthest
extent possible, should be both efficient and fair. To require employers
dissatisfied with the agency’s conciliatory efforts to seek recourse through the
cumbersome legislative process instead of the less time-consuming judicial
process is to stray too far from efficiency. Moreover, to require them to do so
without imposing more rigorous requirements on the agency to comply with its
statutory duty in the first instance strays too far from fairness.
B. Employers Retain the Right to Argue Their Cases on the Merits
The second avenue for remedying the deferential standard’s shortcomings
relies on the fact that the conciliatory process is voluntary for employers, who
always retain the right to argue their cases on the merits.234 Thus, according to
this avenue, even if the EEOC has failed to satisfy its statutory duty to
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See MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 218, at 474.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003).
See LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 431.
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conciliate, employers have not been harmed because they may nonetheless
contest the charges filed against them in court.
This avenue, like the previous one, begins from the assumption that the
agency has failed to satisfy its statutory duty to conciliate and thereby neglects
the underlying purpose of Title VII.235 If the EEOC has not provided an
employer with a meaningful opportunity to conciliate, which is an especially
damaging deprivation if the charge against the employer is untrue, the EEOC
has effectively elevated litigation above conciliation. The stringent standard of
review imposes requirements upon the agency, which the deferential standard
does not, in an effort to ensure that the agency does not “accord[] only
perfunctory significance to its conciliation role.”236
Moreover, this avenue ignores practical concerns. If whether the EEOC has
failed to satisfy its statutory duty to conciliate is a nonissue, then the agency
would have fewer incentives to ensure that it satisfied that duty and,
consequently, more cases would proceed to litigation. If that were to occur,
then there would be increased costs borne both by the agency and, particularly,
employers.237 Additionally, if more money were expended on an expanding
docket of unnecessary litigation, less attention would be given to claims that
actually require litigation to clarify and extend the law. Money would be better
spent litigating these claims instead of those that could have been settled
through conciliation.
CONCLUSION
The EEOC is, unquestionably, no longer a paper tiger. After attempting to
conciliate charges of discrimination with private employers accused of
discrimination, the agency may enforce Title VII by initiating suit against
them.238
Yet it cannot roam uncaged. Concern about the proper standard for
reviewing whether the agency has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate is
more relevant than ever given that the EEOC has released its Strategic Plan for
Fiscal Years 2012–2016, which requires the agency to maintain a certain
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See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)–(d), -5(b) (2006).
See 118 CONG. REC. 3805 (1972) (statement of Sen. James Allen).
237 See LIVINGSTON, supra note 20, at 441 (discussing the advantages of conciliation, including the
avoidance of “creeping back-pay damages, litigation costs, and potential public exposure”).
238 § 2000e-5(f)(1).
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number of systemic discrimination cases on its litigation docket.239 In an effort
to meet its quota of systemic discrimination cases, the agency has greater
incentive to engage in unreasonable conciliatory efforts similar to those in
Asplundh.240
As this Comment has argued, the proper standard for reviewing whether the
EEOC has satisfied its statutory duty to conciliate prior to initiating suit is not
the deferential standard of review, which allows the agency to circumvent
meaningful conciliatory efforts, but, rather, the stringent standard of review.
The stringent standard lacks the shortcomings of the deferential standard and,
perhaps more importantly, it is consistent with the text, purpose, legislative
history, and jurisprudence of Title VII.
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